I Introduction
The issue of how, and whether, Scotland would retain its membership of the EU has become a source of considerable debate. The dominant argument conceptualises Scottish membership as entirely contingent on it being part of the territory of the UK. 1 The argument adopts a state-centric view of the EU and draws heavily on ideas and discourse from public international law. Others argue that Scotland's membership would continue (effectively) automatically by virtue of the possession of EU citizenship by those currently holding UK citizenship and living in Scotland. 2 In contrast, such an argument adopts a citizen-centric view of the EU and draws on rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
The purpose of this article is to offer analysis of the various claims put forth for a scenario in which Scotland votes to become an independent state. While the article focuses on a specific example (in this case Scotland), many of the points are generally applicable. The issue is particularly salient given the broad swell in support for enhanced autonomy and/or independence from sub-state regions across the EU during 2012. Giving serious political and legal thought to the issue the day after a 'Yes' vote in such a referendum is arguably too late. The groundwork ought to be laid now and it is in that spirit that this article is offered.
The article first offers a critique of the official position set out by the Commission (Section II). It then separates the analysis into claims that could be made on behalf of a newly independent Scottish state (Section III), and claims that could be made on behalf of the citizens of a newly independent Scottish state (Section IV). This article argues that automatic expulsion of Scotland on the day of its independence stands at odds with the general principles and spirit of the EU Treaties. While negotiations would certainly be necessary 3 -given that at a minimum the text of the Treaties would have to be amended -it is far-fetched to suggest that Scotland would at any point find itself on the outside seeking membership. It further argues that the Commission, in adopting its current official position, is failing to act in a manner consistent with the role it is charged with. The article goes on to argue that while the complex interplay of UK and EU law could result in the continuance of EU citizenship for many, even all, of those Scots who are UK citizens at the moment of independence, it is hard to envisage how the continuance of EU citizenship for those individuals could somehow be generative of EU membership for Scotland. A brief conclusion closes the article (Section V).
It is worth noting that, though this article addresses a current issue in European
Union Law, a number of the arguments offered could be applicable mutatis mutandis with respect to other future instances of prospective state secession, for example in Catalonia. 4 In particular, the arguments in Sections II and III would, abstractly, apply generally to all secessions within the territory of the Union. The arguments made in Section IV are more specific to the Scottish question, owing to the uniqueness of British nationality law. The consequences for citizens of territories seceding from Member States will, as Section IV argues, depend heavily on the law and practice of the nationality and citizenship law of the Member State concerned.
It is also worth noting that the arguments made in this article based upon an amicable separation. The referendum in Scotland is taking place with the expressed authorisation of the UK Government, and Ministers have stated that the UK Government will 'totally respect' the outcome. 5 In the absence of such authorisation from the government of the Member State concerned, the continuance, or otherwise, of the territory's EU membership would be subject to altogether different considerations which fall outwith the scope of this article.
II Challenging the Official Rhetoric
The Commission has made two official statements on the issue. The first, by then Commission President, Romano Prodi, was delivered on 1 March 2004; the second, by his successor, José Manuel Barroso, was delivered on 10 December 2012. 6 The statements are striking both for their consistency and simplicity. They are also, it is worth noting, more than mere throwaway remarks. The first is a response on behalf of the Commission to a question posed by a Member of the European Parliament; while the second is published correspondence between the President of the Commission and a member of a national legislature. This section will set out the Commission position and critique it.
A The Commission's position: Become Independent, Leave the EU
The first official response from the Commission set out a clear position on the issue and bears quoting at some length. Prodi stated that
The treaties apply to the Member States (Article 299 of the EC Treaty 7 ). When a part of the territory of a Member State ceases to be a part of the state, e.g. because that territory becomes an independent state, the treaties will no longer apply to that territory. In other words, a newly independent region would, by the fact of its independence, become a third country with respect to the Union and the treaties would, from the day of its independence, not apply anymore on its 15 The Commission's position has been supported through statements by the foreign ministers of Spain, Ireland, Latvia and the Czech Republic. The full range of responses can be found here, 'Scottish Independence: Scotland and EU Membership', (7 Mar. 2013) BBC News, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-21601242. 16 There is no direct historical precedent to guide the EU in handling Scottish independence. There have been three examples of a technical reduction of the Community's territory: Algeria's separation from France in 1962, which resulted in Algeria's withdrawal from the EEC; the Antilles separation from the Netherlands in 1962, which resulted in the Antilles' withdrawal from the EEC; and Greenland's withdrawal from the EEC, while remaining part of Denmark albeit it with enhanced autonomy, in 1985. While the first two examples should be seen in their post-colonial context and therefore not particularly analogous to Scotland, Greenland is an interesting case, having achieved the obverse of what Scotland seeks -remaining a part of a Member State while leaving the EEC, as opposed to Scotland leaving its Member State but remaining in the EU. In this instance, Greenlandic people remain Danish and EU Citizens, supporting the argument made below that it is ultimately down to the Member State who is, and is not, a citizen for the purposes of European Union law. It also demonstrates that it is entirely possible for EU Citizenship to continue in the absence of the territorial application of Community Law. Exceptions to this include specific international agreements of which the EU, as a legal entity, is a party. 30 Yet the EU is not party to any agreement that would direct it in its dealings with an independent Scotland. The notion that customary rules of international law would, in the absence of a specific agreement, guide the EU in this area is also doubtful. While some rules of customary international law have been incorporated into EU law, the entire rulebook of customary international law has not been. Indeed in the area of state continuance and succession the notion of customary rules is itself contestable given that it remains one of the murkiest areas of international law.
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An overarching theme of ECJ jurisprudence for decades has been the desire to preserve the EU legal order as something autonomous and a series of opinions and decisions has established a track record in this regard. 32 Specifically on the issue of the relationship between international law and EU law the ECJ controversially decided the Kadi case. 33 The case asked the ECJ to decide whether a UN Security
Council Resolution must necessarily hold primacy over EU law. The ECJ ruled that created its own legal system') and asserted that 'the transfer by the States from their domestic legal system to the Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising under the Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights, against which a subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the concept of the Community cannot prevail'. 
III The Claims of an Independent Scotland
A newly independent Scottish state would be able to make two claims, based upon specific articles of the Treaties. The first claim would be an expectation that Member
States and the Commission would respect the principle of sincere cooperation. The second would be a claim to have the right of self-determination and the principle of democracy respected. Taken together these claims amount to an expectation that negotiations about an independent Scotland's position in the EU would commence following a 'Yes' vote. Furthermore, it could be used to make the claim that a formal accession process, as set out in Article 49 TEU, would not be necessary and that, instead, an amendment to the existing EU Treaties would be made to accommodate a Scotland emerging from the existing UK.
Before considering those claims more closely it is important to note that it is not possible for an independent Scotland to automatically become a Member State. 35 At minimum the existing Treaties would have to be amended to include Scotland as a Member State in the relevant articles. 36 The simplified revision procedure set out in Article 48 TEU would not be applicable in this case. The ordinary revision procedure applying would thus mandate that all EU Member States ratify the amendment (Article 48(4)) but need not trigger a full Convention (Article 48(3)).
Article 4(3) TEU establishes that 'pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out the tasks which flow from the Treaties', before going on to 34 Ibid, at 285. 35 The term automatic, in this context, means a process whereby no negotiation or Treaty amendment would be required on any level. 36 At Article 52 TEU and footnote 1 of the preamble of both the TEU and the TFEU. [w]henever the Treaties, as the Constitutional Charter of the EU, have come to be in force in respect of a state, extending to every part of its territory, they remain in force for the whole territory or territories in question, until such time as any variation of this or derogation from it is determined by an Intergovernmental Conference and enshrined in an appropriate treaty.
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To take such a purely territorial view of Treaties betrays their dual nature as both the EU's institutional instrument and as a source of substantive rules. MacCormick's view represents the extreme opposite to that expressed by Barroso. The more likely answer lies, as this article argues, in the interstices between them. Nonetheless, Article 50 has, therefore, made clearer a principle that could already be identified within the EU's constitutional character.
In addition to the weight of Articles 4 and 50, which taken together suggest an underlying principle opposed to any form of immediate withdrawal or expulsion, an independent Scotland could claim that EU Member States respect its right to selfdetermination, a right that would have been expressed through a clear and democratic process. Article 2 TEU reaffirms the EU's founding on 'the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human 39 Returning, briefly, to the Greenland precedent it is perfectly clear that if Scotland did not vote for independence but, let us assume, received significantly more autonomy from the UK government and then sought to withdraw from the EU (much as Greenland did while remaining part of the Kingdom of Denmark), then 'the negotiation would be no less arduous than that involved in the case of Greenland', see MacCormick, supra n12, at 734. It is not logically consistent to suggest that negotiation would be required in the above scenario, but that in the case of independence expulsion would be automatic. 40 Ibid. 
IV The Claims of the Citizens of an Independent Scotland
In addition to the claims made on behalf of an independent Scottish state, there is a set of claims that might be advanced on behalf of the citizens of that new state. At present, those UK citizens who currently reside in Scotland are also citizens of the 41 The claim, deriving from the political science side of EU studies, is that the EU is a power in the world less for what it does but more for what it is and what it represents. From that, it is argued, derives the power to establish various norms within the international system, and to attract others to those norms so that they might adopt them. Central to the 'normative power' of the EU, it is argued, are commitments to democracy, self-determination, and the rule of law. claims premised on citizenship be activated. Second we consider the status of EU citizenship as set out in the EU Treaties. A plain text reading of those provisions could lead to the conclusion that no claims could be made on behalf of the citizens of an independent Scotland and that the law regarding EU citizenship can be reconciled with the Barroso position of 'leave upon independence and then apply'. The section then goes on to consider EU citizenship as it has developed through the jurisprudence of the ECJ, arguing that this significantly complicates matters. We conclude that no matter how it is examined, the notion that EU citizenship could be in some way generative of EU membership for Scotland is far-fetched.
A UK Nationality Law and the Withdrawal of Citizenship
UK nationality law is far from straightforward and it is impossible to predict with Nationality law in the United Kingdom has a particularly unusual genesis, owing to the Britain's colonial past. In order to fully understand British nationality law and its relationship to EU Citizenship, an appreciation of the development of British nationality law in the 20 th century is necessary.
The status 'British subject' was a product of common law until it was placed on a statutory footing by the British Nationality (where the territory with which they were associated was no longer a colony). British subjects without citizenship and British subjects with Irish citizenship became merely
British subjects -a status that, crucially, cannot be transmitted to the bearer's issue.
In light of these changes to British nationality law, the UK issued a new declaration as to which citizens are to be nationals for the purposes of Community
Law. 56 The 1982 declaration provides that the only British citizens, British subjects with a right of abode in the UK, and British Dependent Territories associated with Gibraltar are to be considered British nationals for the purpose of Community Law.
Insofar as nationality law is concerned this article proposes that the Irish case is the best progenitor to Scottish independence, and that the UK is most likely to address the question of citizenship by reference to Ireland. This, however, is subject to a number of caveats. Alternatively, if the government of R-UK legislated to change British nationality law to reclassify existing Scots British citizens in such a way as that they retained some form of British subject status short of conferring EU citizenship then claims on behalf of far greater a number of Scottish citizens would have to be considered.
Thus the possibility arises that at least some, if not many, of those who would become Scottish citizens and are currently EU citizens will be faced with the loss of that latter status either because of decisions taken by the government of R-UK in
London or because they wish to exercise their choice to be solely Scottish citizens. the acquisition and loss of nationality.' 66 The Court went on to find that it was not lawful for Spain to abrogate Mr Micheletti's rights under the Treaty as a Member
B EU Citizenship in the Treaties
State national by imposing an additional condition upon its recognition. We see here, once again, the interaction between international law and EU law and the need to take the latter into account always when considering questions that at first glance appear to be governed by the former. Member States, in deciding who is and who is not a citizen of that state, must have due regard for Community law and thus it is necessary to consider those rules of Community law to which domestic law must have due regard. The decision in Grzelczyk is important in this regard, albeit more for its rhetoric than its substance. 67 The case concerned a Community national who was a student in a Member State other than that of which he was a national. The question before the Court was whether the rights contained in Articles 18, 20, and 21 of the TEU (ex. This raises the question of whether decisions by the government of R-UK concerning citizenship would be deemed a purely internal situation. The 'purely internal situation' rule is a long-standing principle of Community law and was, until recently, a relatively straightforward one. 76 The purely internal rule in Saunders has been confirmed by a string cases, even after the decision in Grzelcyzk. 77 The result of this rule is that a EU citizen resident in a state other than that of which they are a national enjoys the protection of EU law, while a citizen who is resident in their home state does not. However, by subjecting the withdrawal of citizenship, from a German national resident in Germany, to a proportionality test in Rottmann, the Court appears willing to dis-apply the purely internal situation rule under certain circumstances where citizenship is concerned.
C EU Citizenship in the
The Court, again, dis-applied the purely internal rule in Zambrano. 78 The case However, less than a month later, and despite a seemingly similar set of 76 'The provisions of the Treaty on freedom of movement for workers cannot … be applied to situations which are wholly internal to a Member State, in other words, where there is no factor connecting them to any of the situations envisaged by Community law. pertaining to the first-order right to be a citizen is concerned it is Rottmann, and not
Zambrano, to which we must look for answers.
The article will not speculate as to the outcome of an action brought by a Scottish national facing some variation of withdrawal of their citizenship rights. The multiple variables the court would be forced to consider creates dozens of potential rationes decidendi. It is submitted that however such a case is rationalized, the effective result of such a decision must fall into one of four possible outcomes. First, that withdrawal of Union citizenship from Scots citizens is proportionate, and that while it is not lawful to deprive Union citizens of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of their rights, the question as to whether or not they are citizens at all remains a matter for 
V Conclusion
This article has considered the case of Scottish independence in the context of the EU.
Specifically it has taken issue with the Commission's position, arguing that it rests on incorrect ground and contradicts the general principles and spirit of the Treaties. An independent Scotland would be able to advance a series of claims based on the principles of sincere cooperation, good faith, and respect for democracy, claims which taken together ought to result in as smooth a transition as possible -without a formal accession process -from Scotland as a part of an existing Member State to Scotland as an independent Member State. The article did not argue that negotiation would be unnecessary, or that Treaty change would not be required, but has argued that the Commission's duty is to facilitate and broker a smooth transition that avoids any dislocation to, or compromising of, the single market.
In the event that, for whatever reason, Scotland found itself outside of the EU for some period of time then there is another element to consider, the claims of the 90 Union citizenship for Scots crystallises upon independence -and while those citizens on that date would retain their Union citizenship, their successors would not. 91 Both the third and fourth outcomes are at the extreme end of judicial inventiveness and should therefore be considered most unlikely. In the final analysis the situation is illustrative of the complex web of rights and obligations that an entity such as the EU creates and involves. Far more than an international institution/organisation, yet far less than a federal entity, the EU will always struggle with such issues that fall in these tricky in-between areas. Indeed, pragmatism, good faith, and sincere cooperation seem to represent the best hope that an independent Scotland would continue seamlessly within the EU. The question tackled in this article has to be judged on weights of argument. There is no black-andwhite answer to this question, despite the stance of the current Commission president.
